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Abstract. In abstract argumentation, multiple argumentation seman-
tics have been proposed that allow to select sets of jointly acceptable
arguments from a given argumentation framework, i.e. based only on
the attack relation between arguments. The existence of multiple argu-
mentation semantics raises the question which of these semantics predicts
best how humans evaluate arguments. Previous empirical cognitive stud-
ies that have tested how humans evaluate sets of arguments depending
on the attack relation between them have been limited to a small set of
very simple argumentation frameworks, so that some semantics studied
in the literature could not be meaningfully distinguished by these stud-
ies. In this paper we report on an empirical cognitive study that over-
comes these limitations by taking into consideration twelve argumenta-
tion frameworks of three to eight arguments each. These argumentation
frameworks were mostly more complex than the argumentation frame-
works considered in previous studies. All twelve argumentation frame-
work were systematically instantiated with natural language arguments
based on a certain fictional scenario, and participants were shown both
the natural language arguments and a graphical depiction of the attack
relation between them. Our data shows that grounded and CF2 seman-
tics were the best predictors of human argument evaluation. A detailed
analysis revealed that part of the participants chose a cognitively sim-
pler strategy that is predicted very well by grounded semantics, while
another part of the participants chose a cognitively more demanding
strategy that is mostly predicted well by CF2 semantics.
Keywords: abstract argumentation · argumentation semantics · empir-
ical cognitive study
1 Introduction
The formal study of argumentation is an important field of research within
AI [20]. One important methodological approach in the formal study of argumen-
tation is abstract argumentation as introduced by Dung [10], in which one models
arguments by abstracting away from their internal structure to focus on the re-
lation of attacks between them, i.e. on the relation between a counterargument
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and the argument that it counters. Multiple argumentation semantics have been
proposed in the literature as criteria for selecting acceptable arguments based
on the structure of the attack relation between the arguments (see [4]). Given
that the applicability of abstract argumentation theory to human reasoning is
desirable, this situation gives rise to the question which semantics best predicts
the judgments that humans make about the acceptability of arguments based
on the attack relation between the arguments.
There have been two previous empirical cognitive studies that have tested
how humans evaluate sets of arguments depending on the attack relation between
them, namely a 2010 study by Rahwan et al. [19] as well as a recent study by
the authors of this paper [8]. These previous studies have been limited to small
sets of very simple argumentation frameworks, so that some semantics studied
in the literature could not be meaningfully distinguished by these studies. The
study presented in this paper was designed to overcome this limitation by taking
into account a larger number of argumentation frameworks, including some that
are more complex than any of the argumentation frameworks used in previous
studies.
When studying human evaluation of argumentation frameworks, it is impor-
tant to fill the arguments with meaning rather than just presenting abstract
graphs to humans, as most humans will not be able to properly understand the
reasoning task if it is presented in a purely abstract manner (see Chapter 4 of
[13]). For this reason, we instantiated the argumentation frameworks with nat-
ural language arguments, as was also done by the two previous studies cited
above. When instantiating argumentation frameworks with natural language ar-
guments, one needs to be careful in choosing the natural language arguments
in such a way that for each pair of arguments, humans judge the existence and
directionality of the attack between the two arguments as intended by the de-
signers of the study. In a recent paper [7], we have presented the results of two
empirical cognitive studies that tested how humans judge the existence and di-
rectionality of attacks between pairs of arguments. Note that designing sets of
natural language arguments that – based on our findings in this recent paper –
correspond to complex argumentation frameworks is a highly non-trivial task.
In order to approach this task in a systematic way, we carefully designed a
fictional scenario in which information from multiple sources is analyzed, and
developed a method to instantiate argumentation frameworks of arbitrary com-
plexity with natural language arguments related to this fictional scenario. All
attacks between arguments were based on undercutting the trustworthiness of a
a source, as our recent paper suggests that undercutting the trustworthiness of
a source corresponds well to a unidirectional attack [7]. We used this method to
design twelve sets of natural language arguments corresponding to twelve argu-
mentation frameworks that had been carefully chosen to highlight the differences
between existing argumentation semantics. As the natural language arguments
were quite long and complex, we presented to the participants not only the nat-
ural language arguments, but also a graphical visualization of the corresponding
argumentation framework.
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We compared the results of our study to six widely studied argumentation
semantics, namely to grounded, preferred, semi-stable, CF2, stage and stage2
semantics. More precisely, we compare them to a three-valued justification status
that can be defined with respect to each semantics. Due to certain considerations
about these justification statuses, we do not separately consider complete and
stable semantics in this paper.
The results of our study show that grounded and CF2 semantics were the best
predictors of human argument evaluation. A detailed analysis revealed that part
of the participants chose a cognitively simpler strategy that is predicted very well
by grounded semantics, while another part of the participants chose a cognitively
more demanding strategy that is mostly predicted well by CF2 semantics. In the
discussion of our results, we pay special attention to the observation that the
only argumentation framework for which CF2 semantics predicted the outcome
of this cognitively more demanding strategy not as well as some other semantics
was a framework including a six-cycle.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the
formal preliminaries of abstract argumentation theory that are required in this
paper. In particular, we define stage, CF2 and stage2 semantics and the three
justification statuses used in this paper. In Section 3, we present some general
background from cognitive science that will help to make our methodological
choices and our discussion of the results more understandable. The design of our
study is explained in Section 4. In Section 5, we present and discuss the results
of our study. Section 7 concludes the paper and suggests directions for future
research.
2 Preliminaries of Abstract Argumentation Theory
We will assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of abstract argu-
mentation theory as introduced by Dung [10] and as explained in its current
state-of-the-art form by Baroni et al. [4]. In particular, we will assume that the
reader knows the notion of an argumentation framework (AF) as well as the
complete, grounded, stable, preferred and semi-stable argumentation semantics,
both in their traditional extension-based variant and in their label-based vari-
ant [3,4]. In this section we furthermore define stage, CF2 and stage2 semantics
as well as the notions of strong acceptance and strong rejection.
Stage semantics was first defined by Verheij [22]. The idea behind it is that we
minimize the set of arguments that are not accepted despite not being attacked
by an accepted argument. To formalize this, we first need some auxiliary notions:
Definition 1. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF and let S ⊂ Ar be a set of arguments.
We say that S is conflict-free iff there are no arguments b, c ∈ S such that b
attacks c (i.e. such that (b, c) ∈ att). We define S+ := {b ∈ Ar | for some a ∈ S,
(a, b) ∈ att}
Now stage extensions are defined as follows:
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Definition 2. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF and let S ⊂ Ar. Then S is a stage
extension of F iff S is a conflict-free set such that S∪S+ is maximal with respect
to set inclusion.
CF2 semantics was first introduced by Baroni et al. [5]. The idea behind it
is that we partition the AF into strongly connected components and recursively
evaluate it component by component by choosing maximal conflict-free sets in
each component and removing arguments attacked by chosen arguments. We
formally define it following the notation of Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [12]. For this we
first need some auxiliary notions:
Definition 3. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF. We define a ∼ b iff either a = b or
there is an att-pat path from a to b and there is an att-path from b to a. The
equivalence classes under the equivalence relation ∼ are called strongly connected
components (SCCs) of F . We denote the set of SCCs of F by SCCs(F ). Given
S ⊆ Ar, we define DF (S) := {b ∈ Ar | ∃a ∈ S : (a, b) ∈ att ∧ a 6∼ b}.
We now recursively define CF2 extensions as follows:
Definition 4. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let S ⊆ Ar. Then S is a CF2
extension of F iff either
– |SCCs(F )| = 1 and S is a maximal conflict-free subset of A, or
– |SCCs(F )| > 1 and for each C ∈ SCCs(F ), S ∩ C is a CF2 extension of
F |C−DF (S).
Stage2 semantics as introduced by Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [11,12] combines fea-
tures of stage and CF2 semantics by making use of the SCC-recursive scheme as
in the definition of CF2, but using stage semantics rather than maximal conflict-
freeness as the criterion to apply within a single SCC:
Definition 5. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let S ⊆ Ar. Then S is a stage2
extension of F iff either
– |SCCs(F )| = 1 and S is a stage extension of A, or
– |SCCs(F )| > 1 and for each C ∈ SCCs(F ), S ∩ C is a stage2 extension of
F |C−DF (S).
While the grounded extension of an AF is always unique, an AF with cycles
may have multiple preferred, semi-stable, CF2, stage and stage2 extensions. In
our experiment, however, participants were asked to make a single judgment
about each argument, so we compare their judgments to the justification status of
arguments according to various semantics (see [25,4]), as the justification status
is always unique for each argument. In particular, we focus on the justification
statuses strongly accepted, strongly rejected and weakly undecided, which can be
defined as follows:
Definition 6. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, let σ be an argumentation semantics,
and let a ∈ A be an argument. We say that a is strongly accepted with respect
to σ iff for every σ-extension E of F , a ∈ E. We say that a is strongly rejected
with respect to σ iff for every σ-extension E of F , some b ∈ E attacks a. We
say that a is weakly undecided iff it is neither strongly accepted nor strongly
rejected.
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Note that in the labeling approach, strong acceptance of a corresponds to a
being labeled in by all labelings, strong rejection of a corresponds to a being
labeled out by all labelings, and a weakly undecided status for a of corresponds
to a either being labeled undecided by at least one labeling, or a being labeled
in by some labeling and out by some other labeling.
When comparing semantics to responses by humans, we will use these three
justification statuses as a predictor for the human judgments to accept an argu-
ment, reject it or consider it undecided.
For some argumentation frameworks, stable semantics does not provide any
extension whatsoever, which leads to the rather unintuitive situation that all ar-
guments are both strongly accepted and strongly rejected. For this reason, we do
not consider stable semantics as a potential predictor for human argument eval-
uation in this paper. The justification status with respect to complete semantics
is always identical to the justification status with respect to grounded seman-
tics, so that for the rest of the paper we do not separately consider complete
semantics.
We would like to point our three properties that the justification status of
an argument a satisfies in all semantics considered in this paper:
– If all arguments attacking a are strongly rejected, then a is strongly accepted.
– If some argument attacking a is strongly accepted, then a is strongly rejected.
– If not all arguments attacking a are strongly rejected, then a is not strongly
accepted.
We use this observation to define a notion of coherence of a human judg-
ment of the status of an argument with respect to the judgments of the other
arguments in the same framework.
Definition 7. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let j : Ar → {accept, reject,
undecided} be a function that represents three-valued judgments on the argu-
ments in Ar. Given an argument a ∈ Ar, we say that the judgment of j on a is
coherent iff the following three properties are satisfied:
– If j(b) = reject for each argument b that attacks a, then j(a) = accept.
– If j(b) = accept for some argument b that attacks a, then j(a) = reject.
– If j(b) = undecided for some argument b that attacks a, then either j(a) =
undecided or j(a) = reject.
3 Cognitive Variability of Humans
Given that this paper presents findings of a cognitive empirical study to an au-
dience whose scientific expertise lies mainly in areas outside of cognitive science,
we present some general background from cognitive science that will help to
make our methodological choices and our discussion of the results more under-
standable.
Humans are heterogeneous by nature; they differ from each other with respect
to their cognitive abilities [1]. Cronbach [9] claimed that human heterogeneity is
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actually a major disturbance in the conduction of empirical studies. Cognitive
variability has thus been mostly considered as an undesirable random noise in
cognitive studies. This disturbance is even more problematic in the case of em-
pirical studies that evaluate complex cognitive processes such as logical thinking
and reasoning. Indeed, the inherent difficulty of such tasks not only emphasizes
human differences relative to pure cognitive abilities (such as intelligence), but
also involves motivational aspects that are crucial to obtain a reliable perfor-
mance from the participant [24]. In order to test the cognitive plausibility of
abstract argumentation theory by minimizing unwanted bias purely related to
cognition and motivation properties, we set up a methodology that favored ra-
tional thinking during the assessment.
Previous results showed that individual performance, which has generally
been reported to be quite poor in pure logic and reasoning tasks, could actually
be enhanced by cooperative discussion with peers. For instance, faced with the
Wason selection task [23], humans solving the task in groups achieved a level of
insight that was qualitatively superior to the one achieved by single individu-
als [14,2]. Additionally, and more generally, discussion with peers was shown to
substantially improve motivation to solve a given task [17]. For these reasons, we
decided to incorporate in our methodology a cooperative discussion to help par-
ticipants to elaborate and enrich their thinking. This collective step with peers
was designed to obtain an evaluation of the justification status more reliable
than a single individual judgment. Such reliability is crucial to test the cognitive
plausibility of our predictions.
4 Design of the Study
Sixty-one undergraduate students participated in the empirical study (mean age
= 20.8). With the help of a questionnaire, we asked our participants to evaluate
the acceptability status of natural language arguments. The argument sets were
set in the following fictional context: participants were located on an imaginary
island, faced to conflicting information coming from various islanders, and they
had to evaluate the arguments provided in order to hopefully find the location(s)
of the buried treasure(s). We used such a fictional scenario to avoid as much
as possible any unwanted interference from their general knowledge to make a
decision about the acceptability of a given argument.
All the attacks between the arguments were based on information that a
certain islander is not trustworthy. Consider for example the following set of
arguments that we used in the study:
Argument G: Islander Greg says that islander Hans is not trustworthy
and that there is a treasure buried in front of the well. So we should not
trust what Hans says, and we should dig up the sand in front of the well.
Argument H: Islander Hans says that islander Irina is not trustworthy
and that there is a treasure buried behind the bridge. So we should not
trust what Irina says, and we should dig up the sand behind the bridge.
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Argument I: Islander Irina says that there is a treasure buried near
the northern tip of the island. So we should dig up the sand near the
northern tip of the island.
Argument J: Islander Jenny says that there is a treasure buried near
the southern tip of the island. So we should dig up the sand near the
southern tip of the island.
Here argument G attacks argument H, because argument H is based on infor-
mation from islander Hans, and argument G states that islander Hans is not
trustworthy. Similarly, argument H attacks argument I, whereas arguments I
and J do not attack any argument because they do not state that someone is
not trustworthy. (Note that participants were informed that there might be mul-
tiple treasures, so there is no conflict between a treasure being in one place and
a treasure being in another.)
As the natural language arguments where quite long and complex, we pre-
sented to the participants not only the natural language arguments, but also a
graphical visualization of the corresponding AF. For example, Figure 1 depicts
the AF corresponding to the natural language argument set presented above.
G H I J
Fig. 1. Graphical visualization of the AF corresponding to the natural language argu-
ments G, H, I and J.
Before the start of the questionnaire, we showed to the participants examples
of three simple AFs of two arguments each, namely a unilateral attack from an
argument to another one, a bilateral attack between two arguments, and two
arguments without any attack between them. These examples were presented
both as sets of natural language arguments and as graphically depicted AFs, and
the correspondence between these two modes of presentation were explained.
Participants were instructed to make a judgment about each argument by
ticking a box labeled accept, undecided or reject. For the purpose of making these
judgments, participants were explicitly instructed to follow the principle that
they trust an islander as long as they do not have a good reason to believe that
this islander is not trustworthy. We explained these three possible judgments on
the six arguments from the three simple AFs that we showed as examples. Note
that on these simple AFs, the justification status of each argument is the same in
each of the six semantics considered in this paper, so that our explanations about
these examples did not prime the participants to favor one of the semantics over
the others.
Similarly as in our previous study [8], our methodology incorporated a group
discussion to stimulate more rational thinking: Participants had to first respond
individually to each argument from an argument set, then in a second step they
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had to collaboratively discuss with their peers about the set under consideration,
and finally they had to make a final individual judgment. We formed twenty
groups of mostly three participants each (exceptionally two or four participants).
The questionnaire had two versions, each consisting in six different AFs, for a
total of twelve argument frameworks. The full set of the argument sets used in
our study can be found in the appendix.
5 Results and Discussion
Figure 2 summarizes both the theoretical predictions and the final individual
response of participants in our study. In the first six columns of the figure, we
explicitly represent the justification status of each argument with respect to
each of the six semantics considered in this paper. We depict the justification
status strongly accepted as a white square, strongly rejected as a black square,
and undecided as a gray square. In the next two columns, we have depicted
the proportion of different responses made by the participants as well as the
majority response. With the exception of argument 59, the arguments had a
unique majority response, i.e. a response chosen more often than each of the
other two responses, which is depicted by one of the three pure colors defined
above. In the case of argument 59, reject and undecided were equally frequent
responses, so the majority response square is depicted hald black and half gray.
In a first analysis, we assessed which semantics was the best to predict human
evaluation of the acceptability of our natural language arguments. We computed
the percentage of agreement between the predictions of each semantics and the
final responses made by all participants. Predictions according to grounded se-
mantics were correct in 74.97%, preferred in 68.42%, semi-stable in 62.84%, CF2
in 75.46%, stage in 62.79%, and stage2 in 68.36% of the cases. Exact binomial
tests revealed that for all semantics, the proportion of correct predictions were
significantly larger than the chance level (i.e., 33%), all ps < .001. It is notewor-
thy that, in many cases, the semantics make the same prediction, so to evaluate
the significance of the difference between any two semantics, we should not con-
sider the general predictive accuracy, but rather focus on the instances where
the two semantics under consideration differed. We thus conducted exact bino-
mial tests between each pair of semantics, restricting to the arguments where
different predictions were provided, and we observed that both grounded and
CF2 were systematically better than the other semantics, all ps < .001. How-
ever, grounded and CF2 did not significantly differ from each other, p = .212. In
other words, across all our participants, grounded and CF2 semantics were the
semantics providing the best predictions.
In order to get a better picture of the cognitive strategies employed by par-
ticipants to evaluate arguments, we made some additional analysis of the data.
We observed that participants mostly responded in a way that is coherent in
the sense defined at the end of Section 2. More precisely, 86.7% of the responses
were coherent, and 49 of the 61 participants (i.e. 80.3% of the participants)
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1 AF1
2 AF1
3 AF1
4 AF1
5 AF2
6 AF2
7 AF2
8 AF3
9 AF3
10 AF3
11 AF3
12 AF3
13 AF4
14 AF4
15 AF4
16 AF4
17 AF4
18 AF5
19 AF5
20 AF5
21 AF5
22 AF5
23 AF5
24 AF6
25 AF6
26 AF6
27 AF6
28 AF6
29 AF6
30 AF6
Grounded
Preferred
Semi−stable
CF2
Stage
Stage2
All responses
Majority All
Coherent responses
Majority Coherent
Non−grounded responses
Majority Non−grounded
31 AF7
32 AF7
33 AF7
34 AF7
35 AF7
36 AF8
37 AF8
38 AF8
39 AF9
40 AF9
41 AF9
42 AF9
43 AF10
44 AF10
45 AF10
46 AF10
47 AF10
48 AF11
49 AF11
50 AF11
51 AF11
52 AF11
53 AF12
54 AF12
55 AF12
56 AF12
57 AF12
58 AF12
59 AF12
60 AF12
Grounded
Preferred
Semi−stable
CF2
Stage
Stage2
All responses
Majority All
Coherent responses
Majority Coherent
Non−grounded responses
Majority Non−grounded
Fig. 2. Visualization of the predictions and of the results. Each line represents one of
the 60 arguments in our study. The squares represent theoretical predictions accord-
ing to the six semantics and as well as final individual responses (average response
and majority response) in three categories of participants: all participants, coherent
participants and coherent non-grounded participants. White, black and gray stand for
accept, reject and undecided respectively. For representing the proportion of different
responses, the corresponding square has been filled with white, gray and black area
in proportion to the number of accept, reject and undecided judgments made by the
participants.
had more than 80% coherent responses. Recall that the notion of coherence was
based on properties that are satisfied in all semantics considered in this paper, so
these results show that participants were mostly able to use cognitive strategies
that are in line with these semantics-independent properties. We hypothesize
that those 12 participants who had more than 20% incoherent responses either
did non fully understand the task or are outliers with respect to the cognitive
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strategy they employed. As we were interested in understanding the cognitive
strategies employed by the majority of participants, we decided to disregard
these 12 participants in the further analysis of our data. We use the expression
coherent participants to refer to the 49 participants that had more than 80%
coherent responses. The average and majority responses of coherent participants
are depicted in Figure 2 in the two columns that are to the right of the columns
depicting the responses of all participants.
Within coherent participants, predictions according to grounded semantics
were correct in 82.79%, preferred in 75.17%, semi-stable in 68.10%, CF2 in
82.24%, stage in 67.14%, and stage2 in 74.22% of the cases. A paired t-test
revealed that the predictions here were significantly better than the predictions
across all participants, t(5) = 12.38, p < .001. This is in line with our hypoth-
esis that the identified and excluded 12 participants were outliers. Once again,
grounded and CF2 were the two best semantics, as confirmed by exact binomial
tests restricting to the arguments for which the predictions differed, relevant ps
< .001, and they did not significantly differ from each other, p = .187. Sub-
sequently, within coherent participants, and similarly to our findings within all
participants, grounded and CF2 were the best semantics to predict human re-
sponses.
Furthermore, we would like to point out that in the grounded semantics, 48
of the 60 arguments in our study were undecided. For this reason, the general
strategy of choosing undecided whenever there is some reason for doubt was a
cognitively simple way to get full or almost full agreement with the prediction
of grounded semantics. While it is an interesting observation that a significant
number of participants chose this strategy for the task in our study, we were
also interested in understanding better the cognitive strategy of those who did
not make use of this simplifying general strategy. In order to get some insights
about this cognitive strategy, we decided to make some additional analysis of our
data restricted to those coherent participants that did not employ this grounded-
leaning general strategy. For this purpose, we had to define a criterion for decid-
ing who counts as not having applied the grounded-leaning general strategy. We
chose to use the following criterion: If a participant made at least one coherent
response that was not the response predicted by the grounded semantics, we
considered this participant a non-grounded participant. Of the 49 coherent par-
ticipants, 27 were non-grounded participants according to this criterion, while
22 participants were grounded participants. The average and majority responses
of coherent non-grounded participants are depicted in the two last columns of
Figure 2.
Within coherent non-grounded participants, predictions according to grounded
semantics were correct in 73.09%, preferred in 73.70%, semi-stable in 65.80%,
CF2 in 79.75%, stage in 67.04%, and stage2 in 74.94% of the cases. In this case,
CF2 alone was the best predictor in comparison to every other semantics, with
the largest p = .001. This result provides further insights about the cognitive
strategies adopted by participants: While grounded and CF2 semantics both
provide adequate predictions of the human evaluation of the acceptability of the
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arguments, this is actually due to heterogeneous behavior from our participants.
Our results suggest that 27 non-grounded participants used a more demand-
ing cognitive strategy well predicted by CF2 whereas the other 22 grounded
participants used a more straightforward strategy well predicted by grounded
semantics.
We would like to point out that the only two arguments in which some se-
mantics other than CF2 predicted the judgments of coherent non-grounded par-
ticipants better than CF2 were arguments 59 and 60 according to the numbering
used in Figure 2, which were arguments I and J in the AF depicted in Figure
3. While in CF2 and grounded semantics both of these arguments are weakly
undecided, in preferred, semi-stable, stage and stage2 semantics, I is strongly
rejected and J is strongly accepted.
E
I
F
J
D
G
C
H
Fig. 3. AF in which other semantics made better prediction than CF2
Note that this AF contains a six-cycle, and the behavior of CF2 on a six-
cycle was criticized by Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [12] as unintuitive and used as a
motivation for introducing stage2 semantics. We included this AF in our study
to test whether this criticism on CF2 semantics is in line with human judgments
on such AFs, and our data does indeed support this criticism on CF2. However,
all other arguments on which the predictions of CF2 and stage2 differed were
judged by most coherent non-grounded participants more in line with CF2 than
in line with stage2, so our data does not support stage2 as a good alternative to
CF2.
Taken together, this suggests that for the goal of predicting well human
argument acceptance, it might be necessary to develop a novel semantics that
behaves similarly to CF2 on most argumentation frameworks considered in our
study but which treats even cycles of length 6 or more in the way they are
treated by preferred, semi-stable, stage and stage2 semantics rather than in the
way they are treated by CF2 semantics.
6 Related work
While there have been multiple empirical studies that have evaluated the cor-
respondence between human reasoning and formalism from abstract, structured
and dialogical argumentation (see for example [6,21,15,18]), only two previous
12 Marcos Cramer and Mathieu Guillaume
studies have aimed at comparing human evaluation of arguments to abstract ar-
gumentation semantics: Rahwan et al. [19] tested how humans evaluate two sim-
ple argumentation frameworks, the simple reinstatement framework with three
arguments and the floating reinstatement framework with four arguments. In a
recent paper [8], the authors of the present study have improved Rahwan et al.’s
methodology and applied this improved methodology to three different argu-
mentation frameworks, namely the two AFs already considered by Rahwan as
well as the 3-cycle reinstatement framework with five arguments.
Since the simple reinstatement framework is treated in the same way by all
standard semantics, in Rahwan et al.’s study only the floating reinstatement
framework was able to distinguish between different semantics. While this al-
lowed Rahwan et al. to conclude that for the floating reinstatement argumenta-
tion frameworks the preferred semantics predicts human evaluation of arguments
better than the grounded semantics, it did not allow to distinguish preferred se-
mantics from other non-grounded semantics like semi-stable, stage or CF2. By
including the 3-cycle reinstatement framework in our previous study, we were
able to observe that naive-based semantics like CF2, stage or stage2 are better
predictors for human argument evaluation than admissibility-based semantics
like preferred or semi-stable (see [8]). However, the AFs used in that study still
did not allow to distinguish between the different naive-based semantics, nor
did they allow to distinguish preferred from semi-stable semantics. The present
study was designed to overcome this limitation.
We now compare the results from the present paper with those from our
recent paper [8]. The current study confirmed the result of the previous study
that CF2 semantics is a better predictor for human argument evaluation than
preferred semantics, and extended this result by also showing that CF2 is a
better predictor than semi-stable, stage, stage2 semantics. The previous study
had additionally suggested that both preferred and CF2 semantics are better
predictors than grounded semantics, whereas the current study suggests that
grounded semantics is as good a predictor as CF2 semantics. We believe that
the main reason for this apparent mismatch lies in the fact that our present
study used more complex argumentation frameworks and instantiated them with
a fictional scenario, which made the reasoning task cognitively more challenging
and therefore led to more participants making use of the simplifying strategy of
choosing undecided whenever there is some reason for doubt.
Both Rahwan et al.’s study and our previous study made use of natural
language arguments that referred to real-world entities and actions rather than
to a purely fictional scenario as in the present study. While this reference to
real-world entities and actions reduces the cognitive load for participants, it also
allows them to make use of their world knowledge in judging the arguments.
But as the goal of these studies was to predict argument evaluation based on
the attack relation between arguments rather than based on the content of the
argument and the world knowledge of the participants, this interference of world
knowledge was undesirable. By making use of a fictional scenario in the present
study we avoided this undesirable feature of the previous studies.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have reported on an empirical cognitive study in which we
tested how humans judge the acceptability of arguments in complex argumen-
tation frameworks. A detailed analysis of our results revealed that part of the
participants chose a cognitively simpler strategy that is predicted very well by
grounded semantics, while another part of the participants chose a cognitively
more demanding strategy that is mostly predicted well by CF2 semantics.
The present study suggests multiple paths for future research. As for future
research within formal argumentation, our study suggests that researchers in
this field who are interested in developing formalisms that correspond well to
human argumentation should direct their attention more to CF2 and similarly-
behaved semantics. More precisely, given that the cognitively more demanding
strategy was predicted well by CF2 semantics with the exception of the AF
involving a six-cycle, it seems worthwhile to develop and study novel semantics
that behave similarly to CF2 on most argumentation frameworks considered in
our study but which treat even cycles of length 6 or more in the way they are
treated by preferred, semi-stable, stage and stage2 semantics rather than in the
way they are treated by CF2 semantics. Furthermore, given that in the context
of structured argumentation frameworks like ASPIC+ (see [16]) the rationality
postulate of Closure under Strict Rules is violated for not admissibility-based
semantics like CF2, further research is required to find a method to satisfy this
rationality postulate in structured argumentation while using an argumentation
semantics that corresponds well to human judgments on argument acceptability.
As for future empirical work related to the work presented in this paper,
it would be good to empirically test whether our tentative explanation that
we have given in Section 6 for explaining the mismatch between the current
study and our previous study (see [8]) is correct. Furthermore, it would be good
if some future empirical study could overcome a limitation that all existing
empirical studies on abstract argumentation theory have, namely the limitation
that they can only compare the semantics on the single-outcome justification
status, thus ignoring some of the information present in the full set of extensions
provided by each semantics. For overcoming this limitation, a novel approach to
designing empirical cognitive studies for testing argumentation semantics needs
to be developed.
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Appendix
This appendix provides the instructions, the examples, and the argumentation frameworks
that were used in the study presented in this paper.  There are 12 argumentation frame-
works (AFs) for a total of 60 arguments. The argumentation frameworks are instantiated
with natural language arguments, which are presented together with their graphical visual-
izations, just like in the questionnaires used in the study. The natural language arguments
are labeled with a letter, which is used in the graphical visualizations and was given in the
questionnaire  as  well,  and  additionally  with  the  number  (indicated  in  parenthesis)  to
which we refer in Figure 2.
Instructions
This questionnaire asks you to evaluate whether given arguments are to be accepted or to
be rejected in a certain context. The context of all the arguments in this questionnaire is
the following scenario, which we ask you to imagine:
You arrive at an island that is said to have multiple hidden treasures that you want to
find. Luckily, many of the islanders know about where the treasures are hidden, and some
of them are willing to help you. However, some of the islanders are trying to deceive you
by giving you wrong information. You only have a limited amount of time for digging in
search for treasures, so you want to make sure you make a good decision about where it is
worth to look for a treasure and where it is not worth it.
The only way you can possibly find out about which islanders are trustworthy and
which ones are not is by asking each islander about the trustworthiness of the other is -
landers. You decide to follow the principle that you trust an islander as long as you don't
have a good reason to believe that this islander is not trustworthy.
First you go around asking islanders for information, and you take notes of which is-
lander told you what. Furthermore, based on what the islanders tell you, you write down
arguments for searching a treasure in certain places and for not trusting certain islanders.
Once you have asked all islanders, you look back at the list of arguments that you have
formulated.
Now your task is to decide which of these arguments you accept and which ones you
reject. If there is no way to decide between accepting and rejecting an argument, you can
also mark it as undecided. Please tick one box per argument (i.e. per line).
In order to help you understand the logical relations between the arguments, we also
provide a graphical representation of the logical attacks between arguments. This is ex-
plained in more detail in the examples in the following sections.
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Example 1
Argument A: Islander Amy says that there is a treasure buried between the two tall
palm trees. So we should dig up the sand between the two palm trees.
Argument B: Islander Berta says that islander Amy is not trustworthy and that there
is a treasure buried behind the tower. So we should not trust what Amy says, and we
should dig up the sand behind the tower.
Here argument B provides a reason to not trust Amy, and thus to reject argument A. So
argument B can be used as a counterargument against argument A. Another way of saying
this is to say that argument B attacks argument A.
Argument A, on the other hand, does not provide a reason to reject argument B, so
argument A cannot be used as a counterargument against argument B. In this case we say
that argument A does not attack argument B.
The logical relation between argument A and argument B can be depicted as follows:
The arrow from B to A means that argument B attacks argument A. Since argument A
does not attack argument B, there is no arrow back from A to B.
Given the principle that you trust an islander as long as you don't have a good reason to
believe that this islander is not trustworthy, you should accept argument B, since it  is
based on trusting islander Berta and you don't have any reasons to believe that Berta is not
trustworthy. And given that you accept argument B, you have to reject argument A, since
argument A is based on trusting islander Amy and argument B provides a good reason to
believe that Amy is not trustworthy.
One can state the reasoning in the previous paragraph more simply as follows: Since no
argument attacks argument B, argument B should be accepted. Since an argument that is
accepted attacks argument A, argument A should be rejected.
To indicate the choice of rejecting argument A and accepting argument B, you should
tick the boxes as follows:
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Example 2
Argument C: Islander Claire says that islander Daniel is not trustworthy and that there
is a treasure buried on the shore of the lake. So we should not trust what Daniel says,
and we should dig up the sand on the shore of the lake.
Argument D: Islander Daniel says that islander Claire is not trustworthy and that there
is a treasure buried next to the large rock. So we should not trust what Claire says, and
we should dig up the sand next to the large rock.
Here argument C provides a reason to not trust Daniel, and thus to reject argument D.
So argument C attacks argument D. Similarly, argument D provides a reason to reject
argument C, i.e. argument D also attacks argument C. So graphically, the situation is as
follows:
                                                 
Since the two arguments are in conflict, we cannot accept both of them. But there is no
reason to prefer one argument over the other, so we cannot decide which one to accept and
which one to reject. For this reason, we consider both arguments as undecided.
To indicate that you consider both arguments undecided, you should tick the boxes as
follows:
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Example 3
Argument E: Islander Ernst says that there is a treasure buried between the two hills.
So we should dig up the sand between the two hills.
Argument F: Islander Fiona says that there is a treasure buried behind the big rock. So
we should dig up the sand behind the big rock.
There is no conflict between the information provided by the two arguments. In other
words, neither argument attacks the other. This can be depicted graphically as follows:
                                                 
Here, there is no arrow between argument E and argument F, as neither of them attacks
the other.
Since no reason is given to believe that either islander Ernst or islander Fred is not
trustworthy, the principle that  you trust  an islander as long as you don't  have a good
reason to believe that this islander is not trustworthy implies that you should trust both
Ernst and Fiona. Thus you should accept both arguments. 
One can state this reasoning more simply as follows: Since no argument is attacked by
any argument, we can accept both arguments.
To indicate that you accept both arguments, you should tick the boxes as follows:
20
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Argumentation Framework 1
Argument G (1):  Islander Greg says that islander Hans is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried in front of the well. So we should not trust what Hans says, and
we should dig up the sand in front of the well.
Argument H (2):  Islander Hans says that  islander Irina is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried behind the bridge. So we should not trust what Irina says, and we
should dig up the sand behind the bridge.
Argument I (3): Islander Irina says that there is a treasure buried near the northern tip
of the island. So we should dig up the sand near the northern tip of the island. 
Argument J (4): Islander Jenny says that there is a treasure buried near the southern
tip of the island. So we should dig up the sand near the southern tip of the island.
                   
Argumentation Framework 2
Argument T (5): Islander Tina says that islander Umberto is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried between the olive trees. So we should not trust what Umberto
says, and we should dig up the sand between the olive trees.
Argument U (6): Islander Umberto says that islander Tina and islander Victor are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried to the south of the swamp. So we should not
trust what Tina and Victor say, and we should dig up the sand to the south of the swamp.
Argument V (7): Islander Victor says that there is a treasure buried to the north of the
swamp. So we should dig up the sand to the north of the swamp. 
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Argumentation Framework 3
Argument L (8): Islander Lisa says that islander Mila and islander Olivia are not trust-
worthy and that there is a treasure buried on the peak of the mountain. So we should not
trust what Mila and Olivia say, and we should dig up the sand on the peak of the moun-
tain.
Argument M (9):  Islander Mila says that  islander Neil and islander Olivia are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried next to the old wall. So we should not trust
what Neil and Olivia say, and we should dig up the sand next to the old wall.
Argument N (10):  Islander Neil says that  islander Lisa and islander Olivia are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried between the two oak trees. So we should not
trust what Lisa and Olivia say, and we should dig up the sand between the two oak trees.
Argument O (11): Islander Olivia says that islander Peter is not trustworthy, and that
there is a treasure buried near the eastern tip of the island. So we should not trust what
Peter says, and we should dig up the sand near the eastern tip of the island.
Argument P (12): Islander Peter says that there is a treasure buried near the southern
tip of the island. So we should dig up the sand near the southern tip of the island.
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Argumentation Framework 4
Argument R (13): Islander Ron says that islander Sarah is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried next to the harbor. So we should not trust what Sarah says, and
we should dig up the sand next to the harbor.
Argument S (14): Islander Sarah says that islander Tom is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried north of the forest. So we should not trust what Tom says, and
we should dig up the sand north of the forest.
Argument T (15): Islander Tom says that islander Ron, islander Sarah and islander
Ursula are not trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried south of the forest. So we
should not trust what Ron, Sarah and Ursula say, and we should dig up the sand south of
the forest.
Argument U (16): Islander Ursula says that islander Vincent is not trustworthy, and
that there is a treasure buried next to the old monument. So we should not trust what
Vincent says, and we should dig up the sand next to the old monument.
Argument V (17): Islander Vincent says that there is a treasure buried next to the ruins.
So we should dig up the sand next to the ruins.
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Argumentation Framework 5
Argument W (18): Islander Walter says that islander Xavier is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried between the ponds. So we should not trust what Xavier says, and
we should dig up the sand between the ponds.
Argument X (19): Islander Xavier says that islander Yanis and islander Anna are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried next to the temple. So we should not trust
what Yanis and Anna say, and we should dig up the sand next to the temple.
Argument Y (20):  Islander Yanis says that islander Zoe and islander Anna are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried to the east of the lake. So we should not
trust what Zoe and Anna say, and we should dig up the sand to the east of the lake.
Argument Z (21): Islander Zoe says that islander Walter is not trustworthy, and that
there is a treasure buried between the two highest mountains. So we should not trust what
Walter says, and we should dig up the sand between the two highest mountains.
Argument A (22): Islander Anna says that islander Bella is not trustworthy, and that
there is a treasure buried to the west of the lake. So we should not trust what Bella says,
and we should dig up the sand to the west of the lake.
Argument B (23): Islander Bella says that there is a treasure buried to the north of the
lake. So we should dig up the sand to the north of the lake.
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Argumentation Framework 6
Argument C (24): Islander Charlie says that islander Dorothy is not trustworthy and
that there is a treasure buried to the south of the high mountain. So we should not trust
what Dorothy says, and we should dig up the sand to the south of the high mountain.
Argument D (25): Islander Dorothy says that islander Emma is not trustworthy and
that there is a treasure buried to the west of the high mountain. So we should not trust
what Emma says, and we should dig up the sand to the west of the high mountain.
Argument E (26): Islander Emma says that islander Fred and islander Hannah are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried to the east of the high mountain. So we
should not trust what Fred and Hannah say, and we should dig up the sand to the east of
the high mountain.
Argument F (27): Islander Fred says that islander George and islander Hannah are not
trustworthy, and that there is a treasure buried to the north of the high mountain. So we
should not trust what George and Hannah say, and we should dig up the sand to the north
of the high mountain.
Argument G (28): Islander George says that islander Charlie is not trustworthy, and
that there is  a treasure buried to the west  of the village. So we should not trust  what
Charlie says, and we should dig up the sand to the west of the village.
Argument H (29): Islander Hannah says that islander Ivan is not trustworthy, and that
there is a treasure buried to the south of the village. So we should not trust what Ivan says,
and we should dig up the sand to the south of the village.
Argument I (30): Islander Ivan says that there is a treasure buried to the north of the
village. So we should dig up the sand to the north of the village.
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Argumentation Framework 7
Argument G (31): Islander Greg says that islander Hans, islander Irina and islander
Jenny are not trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried in front of the well. So we
should not trust what Hans, Irina and Jenny say, and we should dig up the sand in front of
the well.
Argument H (32): Islander Hans says that islander Ken is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried behind the bridge. So we should not trust what Ken says, and we
should dig up the sand behind the bridge.
Argument I (33): Islander Irina says that islander Ken is not trustworthy and that there
is a treasure buried near the northern tip of the island. So we should not trust what Ken
says, and we should dig up the sand near the northern tip of the island.
Argument J (34): Islander Jenny says that islander Ken is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried near the southern tip of the island. So we should not trust what
Ken says, and we should dig up the sand near the southern tip of the island.
Argument K (35): Islander Ken says that there is a treasure buried near the mouth of
the river. So we should dig up the sand near the mouth of the river.
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Argumentation Framework 8
Argument T (36): Islander Tina says that islander Umberto is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried between the olive trees. So we should not trust what Umberto
says, and we should dig up the sand between the olive trees.
Argument U (37): Islander Umberto says that islander Victor is not trustworthy and
that there is a treasure buried to the south of the swamp. So we should not trust what
Victor says, and we should dig up the sand to the south of the swamp.
Argument V (38): Islander Victor says that islander Umberto is not trustworthy and
that there is a treasure buried to the north of the swamp. So we should not trust what
Umberto says, and we should dig up the sand to the north of the swamp. 
                    
Argumentation Framework 9
Argument  L (39):  Islander  Lisa  says  that  islander  Mila  and  islander  Neil  are  not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried on the peak of the mountain. So we should
not trust  what  Mila and Neil  say,  and we should dig up the sand on the peak of  the
mountain.
Argument M (40):  Islander Mila says that  islander Lisa and islander Neil  are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried next to the old wall. So we should not trust
what Lisa and Neil say, and we should dig up the sand next to the old wall.
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Argument N (41): Islander Neil says that islander Olivia is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried between the two oak trees. So we should not trust what Olivia
says, and we should dig up the sand between the two oak trees.
Argument O (42): Islander Olivia says that there is a treasure buried near the eastern
tip of the island. So we should dig up the sand near the eastern tip of the island.
                              
Argumentation Framework 10
Argument R (43): Islander Ron says that islander Sarah is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried next to the harbor. So we should not trust what Sarah says, and
we should dig up the sand next to the harbor.
Argument S (44):  Islander Sarah says that  islander Ron and islander Tom are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried north of the forest. So we should not trust
what Ron and Tom say, and we should dig up the sand north of the forest.
Argument T (45): Islander Tom says that islander Ursula is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried south of the forest. So we should not trust what Ursula says, and
we should dig up the sand south of the forest.
Argument U (46): Islander Ursula says that islander Vincent is not trustworthy, and
that there is a treasure buried next to the old monument. So we should not trust what
Vincent says, and we should dig up the sand next to the old monument.
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Argument V (47): Islander Vincent says that islander Tom is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried next to the ruins. So we should not trust what Tom says, and we
should dig up the sand next to the ruins.
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Argumentation Framework 11
Argument W (48): Islander Walter says that islander Xavier is not trustworthy and that
there is a treasure buried between the ponds. So we should not trust what Xavier says, and
we should dig up the sand between the ponds.
Argument X (49): Islander Xavier says that islander Yanis and islander Zoe are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried next to the temple. So we should not trust
what Yanis and Zoe say, and we should dig up the sand next to the temple.
Argument Y (50): Islander Yanis says that islander Walter and islander Zoe are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried to the east of the lake. So we should not
trust what Walter and Zoe say, and we should dig up the sand to the east of the lake.
Argument Z (51): Islander Zoe says that islander Anna is not trustworthy, and that
there is a treasure buried between the two highest mountains. So we should not trust what
Anna says, and we should dig up the sand between the two highest mountains.
Argument A (52): Islander Anna says that there is a treasure buried to the west of the
lake. So we should dig up the sand to the west of the lake.
                    
Argumentation Framework 12
Argument C (53): Islander Charlie says that islander Dorothy is not trustworthy and
that there is a treasure buried to the south of the high mountain. So we should not trust
what Dorothy says, and we should dig up the sand to the south of the high mountain.
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Argument D (54): Islander Dorothy says that islander Emma is not trustworthy and
that there is a treasure buried to the west of the high mountain. So we should not trust
what Emma says, and we should dig up the sand to the west of the high mountain.
Argument E (55): Islander Emma says that islander Fred and islander Ivan are not
trustworthy and that there is a treasure buried to the east of the high mountain. So we
should not trust what Fred and Ivan say, and we should dig up the sand to the east of the
high mountain.
Argument F (56): Islander Fred says that islander George and islander Ivan are not
trustworthy, and that there is a treasure buried to the north of the high mountain. So we
should not trust what George and Ivan say, and we should dig up the sand to the north of
the high mountain.
Argument G (57): Islander George says that islander Hannah is not trustworthy, and
that there is  a treasure buried to the west  of the village. So we should not trust  what
Hannah says, and we should dig up the sand to the west of the village.
Argument H (58): Islander Hannah says that islander Charlie is not trustworthy, and
that there is a treasure buried to the east of the village. So we should not trust what Charlie
says, and we should dig up the sand to the east of the village.
Argument I (59):  Islander Ivan says that islander John is not trustworthy, and that
there is a treasure buried to the south of the village. So we should not trust what John
says, and we should dig up the sand to the south of the village.
Argument J (60): Islander John says that there is a treasure buried to the north of the
village. So we should dig up the sand to the north of the village. 
                     
